Since the resignation of Nepal's Maoist-led government in May, there's been a progressive slide towards greater confrontation. A general strike
called by the Maoists has paralysed the country, costing the economy Nepali Rs 1.2 billion daily by some estimates. It is the latest step in the unravelling of the fragile peace achieved by the Comprehensive Peace Accord in 2006. With each government-Maoist impasse, the adoption and enforcement of a new constitution by the May 2010 deadline seems that much more improbable.
At the heart of the current problems is President Ram Baran Yadav's reinstatement of chief of army General Rookmangud Katawal, who was dismissed by the Maoist government for insubordination. It is, admittedly, a conundrum. On the one hand, demobilisation and reintegration are essential steps in the resolution of any civil conflict. On the other, it may be a better idea integrating erstwhile Maoist cadres into police and paramilitary forces rather than the army, which by the standards of the region is a professional force. It is a tricky question and requires broad-based deliberation and consensus; it has neither.
Worryingly, their May failure seems to have prompted the Maoists to opt for a strategy of polarisation instead. Their unilateral declaration of autonomous states within Nepal amounts to an usurpation of the Constituent Assembly's authority. There's also the Maoist refusal to participate in administrative processes for the all-party consensus called for by the interim constitution, and supremo Prachanda's backing out of the selection meeting for a replacement chief justice of the supreme court. All these signs point towards an attempt to push the government and military into a confrontation that will weaken them. Meanwhile, the Young Communist League continues to hover on the fringes, offering an implicit threat of violence.
This is a process of attrition that could overturn every precept of the 2006 accord to the benefit of neither the government, nor the Maoists themselves ^ and least of all, the Nepali people. And it will not be to New Delhi's advantage either. With its channels to the government, army and Maoists, it is in a unique position to help steer Nepal back on course towards its May 2010 constitution. And the message it must send is a simple one ^ parliamentary democracy in a unitary Nepal is non-negotiable.
called by the Maoists has paralysed the country, costing the economy Nepali Rs 1.2 billion daily by some estimates. It is the latest step in the unravelling of the fragile peace achieved by the Comprehensive Peace Accord in 2006. With each government-Maoist impasse, the adoption and enforcement of a new constitution by the May 2010 deadline seems that much more improbable.
At the heart of the current problems is President Ram Baran Yadav's reinstatement of chief of army General Rookmangud Katawal, who was dismissed by the Maoist government for insubordination. It is, admittedly, a conundrum. On the one hand, demobilisation and reintegration are essential steps in the resolution of any civil conflict. On the other, it may be a better idea integrating erstwhile Maoist cadres into police and paramilitary forces rather than the army, which by the standards of the region is a professional force. It is a tricky question and requires broad-based deliberation and consensus; it has neither.
Worryingly, their May failure seems to have prompted the Maoists to opt for a strategy of polarisation instead. Their unilateral declaration of autonomous states within Nepal amounts to an usurpation of the Constituent Assembly's authority. There's also the Maoist refusal to participate in administrative processes for the all-party consensus called for by the interim constitution, and supremo Prachanda's backing out of the selection meeting for a replacement chief justice of the supreme court. All these signs point towards an attempt to push the government and military into a confrontation that will weaken them. Meanwhile, the Young Communist League continues to hover on the fringes, offering an implicit threat of violence.
This is a process of attrition that could overturn every precept of the 2006 accord to the benefit of neither the government, nor the Maoists themselves ^ and least of all, the Nepali people. And it will not be to New Delhi's advantage either. With its channels to the government, army and Maoists, it is in a unique position to help steer Nepal back on course towards its May 2010 constitution. And the message it must send is a simple one ^ parliamentary democracy in a unitary Nepal is non-negotiable.
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