Since February 13, when they launched Operation Moshtarak (“Operation Together”), NATO and Afghan National Army forces have encountered fierce Taliban resistance in Marjah, a town of 80,000 people in the southwestern province of Helmand. The province has the world's largest opium output and Marjah alone yields the Taliban an estimated $2 million a month. Militarily, the surrounding network of canals interspersed with residential compounds makes defence easier, not least with improvised explosive devices. NATO has now sent in more than 15,000 troops as well as helicopters and drones to attack Marjah and the Taliban have confounded their expectations by staying and fighting. Even President Hamid Karzai has demanded that NATO must protect civilians. The toll of ‘collateral deaths' has been mounting relentlessly, with the U.S.'s high-tech electronic war killing innocent children, women, and men in an unprecedented variety of ways. Marc W. Herold of the University of New Hampshire, a regular contributor to Frontline on the subject, has assiduously developed a database that seeks to account for every Afghan civilian killed by the U.S./NATO forces since the 2001 invasion. A master table he has made available to The Hindu indicates that there have been close to 10,000 civilian impact deaths resulting from U.S./NATO military actions in Afghanistan since October 7, 2001. Shockingly, the data reveal, in the words of Professor Herold, that “more Afghan civilians died under the Obama clock in 2009 than under his predecessor, George W. Bush during 2008.”
A senior British officer estimates that it will take 30 days to clear the Taliban from the targeted areas. The occupation force commanders know that stability cannot be restored without public trust. Scepticism and cynicism are justifiably widespread among the locals, who have no illusions about the corruption and the chaotic nature of the Afghan state that is supposed to replace the Taliban in Helmand. One strategic analysis notes that in many areas the Taliban are the only source of stable civil authority and everyday security. The U.S. has hinted at the possibility of talks with the Taliban, possibly in the hope of marginalising its more extreme elements. But even that is an uncertain strategy, as many of the younger Taliban leaders are known hardliners. Secondly, it is highly doubtful if a centralised state can be created in a culture where people have for centuries thought and acted locally and tribally. Thirdly, NATO may take Marjah but holding it will be another matter. It will make the putative capture of Kandahar province, a more important Taliban stronghold than Helmand, far more difficult. As the civilian toll mounts, as the dossier of war crimes grows fatter, the entire U.S. project of creating a reshaped Afghan body politic so that it can depart in 18 months is in deep trouble.
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